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ABSTRACT
The ‘robot rights’ debate, and its related question of ‘robot respon-
sibility’, invokes some of the most polarized positions in AI ethics.
While some advocate for granting robots rights on a par with hu-
man beings, others, in a stark opposition argue that robots are
not deserving of rights but are objects that should be our slaves.
Grounded in post-Cartesian philosophical foundations, we argue
not just to deny robots ‘rights’, but to deny that robots, as arti-
facts emerging out of and mediating human being, are the kinds
of things that could be granted rights in the first place. Once we
see robots as mediators of human being, we can understand how
the ‘robot rights’ debate is focused on first world problems, at the
expense of urgent ethical concerns, such as machine bias, machine
elicited human labour exploitation, and erosion of privacy all im-
pacting society’s least privileged individuals. We conclude that, if
human being is our starting point and human welfare is the pri-
mary concern, the negative impacts emerging from machinic sys-
tems, as well as the lack of taking responsibility by people design-
ing, selling and deploying such machines, remains the most press-
ing ethical discussion in AI.
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1 THE DEBATE: ROBOT RIGHTS
Ethicists have been discussing the notion of ‘robot rights’: the idea
thatwe should grant (future) artificially intelligent machines ‘rights’,
comparable to ‘human rights’, courtesy of their constitution as in-
telligent, autonomous agents. Some promote robot rights within
an overall techno-optimistic, materialistic worldview, arguing we
must avoid any a priori ‘biological chauvinism’. The reasoning goes;
if machines would bring forth the sort of agency that we attribute
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to ourselves, we have no reason not to grant them the sorts of
rights we grant ourselves [3, 9, 16].
A more critical, emancipatory strand of robot ethics claims that
granting robots rights is not only ethically justified, but more fun-
damentally helps to reflect on existing undercurrents in (Western)
ethical debates. Discussing robot rights helps to undo ethics of
its implicit paternalistic, Western oppressive foundations and con-
tribute to the emancipation of oppressed groups such as women
and people of colour [23].
In stark contrast, some claim we actually should call robots our
slaves [10]. Bryson, one of the advocates of this position, is well
aware of the connotations implied by the term slave. She explains
slavery historically means dehumanisation, something most cul-
tures have since come to be opposed to, for very good reasons:
“Given the very obviously human beings that have
been labelled inhuman in the global culture’s very re-
cent past, many seem to have grown wary of apply-
ing the label at all. For example, Dennett [16] argues
that we should allocate the rights of agency to any-
thing that appears to be best reasoned about as acting
in an intentional manner. ...Dennett’s ... generosity is
almost definitionally nice.” [10, p. 2]
Bryson however disagrees with Dennett. Granting robots rights,
she reasons, is not always nice. Human well-being should be our
prime concern and any concerns with robots should never distract
us from the real target. We fully agree with her here.
Yet we disagree robots should be treated as ‘slaves’. In defense
of her position, Bryson states: “But surely dehumanization is only
wrong when it’s applied to someone who really is human?” Our
position would be that ‘dehumanization’ is not so much wrong for
robots, it is impossible. One cannot dehumanize something that
wasn’t human to begin with. If one uses the term slave, one im-
plicitly assumes that the being one so names is the kind of being
can be ‘dehumanized’. One has already implicitly ‘humanized’ the
robot, before subsequently enslaving it. One should obviously not
enslave someone first taken to be human.
Bryson already accepts part of framing of the narrative of robo-
ethics, where a discussion to consider the ontological status of
robots in relation to rights is legitimate in principle. Our position is
that the entire discussion is completely misguided. At best, robot
ethics debates are First World philosophical musings, too disen-
gaged from actual affairs of humans in the real world. In the worst
case, it may contain bad faith — the white, male academic’s diminu-
tive characterization of actually oppressed people and their fight
for rights, by appealing to ‘reason’.
2 A SUMMARY OF OUR ARGUMENT
Some may argue that the idea of robot rights is a peculiar, irrele-
vant discussion existing only at the fringes of AI ethics research
more broadly construed, and as such devoting our time to it would
not be paying justice to the important work done in that field.
But the idea of robot rights is, in principle, perfectly legitimate
if one stays true to the materialistic commitments of artificial in-
telligence: in principle it should be possible to build an artificially
intelligent machine, and if we would succeed in doing so, there
would be no reason not to grant this machine the rights we at-
tribute to ourselves. Our critique therefore is not that the reason-
ing is invalid as such, but rather that we should question its un-
derlying assumptions. Robot rights signal something more serious
about AI technology, namely, that, grounded in their materialist
techno-optimism, scientists and technologists are so preoccupied
with the possible future of an imaginary machine, that they forget
the very real, negative impact their intermediary creatures - the
actual AI systems we have today - have on actual human beings.
In other words: the discussion of robot rights is not to be separated
from AI ethics, and AI ethics should concern itself with scrutiniz-
ing and reflecting deeply on underlying assumptions of scientists
and engineers, rather than seeing its project as ’just’ a practical
matter of discussing the ethical constraints and rules that should
govern AI technologies in society.
Our starting point is not to deny robots ‘rights’, but to deny
that robots are the kinds of beings that could be granted or de-
nied rights. We suggest it makes no sense to conceive of robots as
slaves, since ‘slave’ falls in the category of being that robots aren’t.
Human beings are such beings. We believe animals are such beings
(though a discussion of animals lies beyond the scope of this paper).
We take a post-Cartesian, phenomenological view in which being
human means having a lived embodied experience, which itself is
embedded in social practices. Technological artifacts form a crucial
part of this being, yet artifacts themselves are not that same kind
of being. The relation between human and technology is tightly
intertwined, but not symmetrical.
Based on this perspective we turn to the agenda for AI ethics.
For some ethicists, to argue for robot rights, stems from their aver-
sion against a human arrogance in face of the wider world. We
too wish to fight human arrogance. But we see arrogance first and
foremost in the techno-optimistic fantasies of the technology in-
dustry, making big promises to recreate ourselves out of silicon,
surpassing ourselves with ‘super-AI’ and ‘digitally uploading’ our
minds so as to achieve immortality, while at the same time ex-
ploiting human labour. Most debate on robot rights, we feel, is ul-
timately grounded in the same techno-arrogance. What we take
from Bryson, is her plea to focus on the real issue: human oppres-
sion. We forefront the continual breaching of human welfare and
especially of those disproportionally impacted by the development
and ubiquitous integration of AI into society. Our ethical stance
on human being is that being human means to interact with our
surroundings in a respectful and just way. Technology should be
designed to foster that. That, in turn, should be ethicists’ primary
concern.
In what follows we first lay out our post-Cartesian perspective
on human being and the role of technologywithin that perspective.
Next, we explain why, even if robots should not be granted rights,
we also reject the idea of the robot as a slave. In the final section, we
call attention to human welfare instead. We discuss how AI, rather
than being the potentially oppressed, is used as a tool by humans
(with power) to oppress other humans, and how a discussion about
robot rights diverts attention from the pressing ethical issues that
matter. We end by reflecting on responsibilities, not of robots, but
those of their human producers.
2.1 A Post-Cartesian reframing
The robot, like so many technologies created by humans, is created
‘in the image of ourselves’. But what is the self-image we use as a
model? AI from its early days attempted to engineer a cognitivist
interpretation of human thinking in the machine, which contains
a (neo-)Cartesian distinction between, on the one hand the mental
system, taken to be equivalent with the software of the machine,
and the physical body, equivalent to the robot’s physical parts. In
contrast to Descartes’ dualism however, cognitivists hold that the
mental system is also physically realized, by mapping mental con-
tent onto physical processes (e.g., brain activation patterns). In gen-
eral this is still the common sense conceptual model that underlies
attempts at building intelligent machines. Consequently, for tech-
nologists and engineers a ‘human’, on this model, can in principle
be ‘built’, because what it takes to be human, is ultimately a par-
ticular, complex configuration of physical processes [12]. Starting
from that model, the idea of robot rights makes perfect sense.
To understand how we reconceptualize the being of a robot,
we need to look at our conception of human being, which rejects
the image just described. In our post-Cartesian, phenomenologi-
cally inspired position, human being is a lived, embodied experi-
ence, or what Merleau-Ponty, following Husserl called, ‘being-in-
the-world’. Embodied, enactive cognitive science, which follows
this reasoning explains how biological living systems - living bod-
ies - ‘enact’ their perceptual world, through ongoing interactions
with the environment [17]. These interactions self-organise into
sensorimotor couplings wemay call habits or skills. Based on these
couplings, we perceive (or rather ‘enact’) things in the world in the
first instance as affordances for action [21]. The things-as-affordances
we perceive have direct relations with our bodily skills (Dreyfus &
Dreyfus, 2004). To give a common-sense example: a park bench ‘is’
a different thing to a skateboarder, or a homeless person, than it is
to a casual visitor. Embodied skills self-organize out of, and work
to further sustain the organism. A second aspect concerns the in-
herently social nature of human being. We are always already sit-
uated within social practices, and the way we interact with and
make sense of the world needs to be understood against this back-
ground. This view has been developed by the phenomenologists
[34], and similarly developed through research on joint attention,
situated practices [28] and participatory sensemaking [17].
Starting from human being as lived embodied interaction we
can re-frame the role of technology. First, human-made artifacts at-
tain their meaning as mediating our world enactment, by sustain-
ing, breaking, changing, enriching sensorimotor couplings. This
can be found in Heidegger’s (1927) discussion of the hammer as
being ‘ready-to-hand’, and in Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) discussion of
the blind person’s cane as extending the person’s body.Within the
more recent embodied cognitive science development, it relates to
the idea of distributed cognition and the extended mind [13]. Sec-
ond, the meaning of artifacts must be understood within the con-
text of our embedding social situation. In other words, things are
what they are, because of the way they configure our social prac-
tices [37] and technology extends the biological body. Our concep-
tion of human being, then, is that we are and have always been
fully embedded and enmeshed with our designed surroundings,
and that we are critically dependent on this embeddedness for sus-
taining ourselves [7].
The Cartesian illusion of setting ourselves apart from the natu-
ral, artificial and social world that we live in, spurred the project
of building an artificial ‘intelligence’, where intelligence is mod-
eled on a human intelligence that is detached from the world and
looks upon it, and the artifacts we create are things in that ‘objec-
tive’, outside world. In contrast, Coeckelbergh’s ‘social-relational’
approach to machine ethics on the surface seems similar to our
perspective [14]. Yet he arrives at opposite conclusions. For Co-
eckelbergh, the ‘social-relational’ describes the way people vari-
ably perceive artifacts, and perceiving them as ‘mere machines’ is
therefore just as valid as is perceiving them as ‘intelligent others’.
In our view both Coeckelbergh and more traditional theorists all
fail to realize how deeply embedded we already are with our tech-
nologies. A deep appreciation of this embeddedness does not en-
tail artifacts should be seen as ‘agents like ourselves’ (even if we
socially talk about them that way): what we need to do is return
to the realization that these technologies are always already part
of ourselves, as elements of our embodied being in the world1 [39].
2.2 Slaves are Humans Abused as Machines
In [22] and elsewhere [23], Gunkel builds a rhetoric in which he
contrasts the “seemingly cold and rather impersonal industrial robots”
to present-day social robots, which “share physical and emotional
spaces with the user” [22]. “For this reason”, he suggests “it is
reasonable to inquire about the social status and moral standing
of these technologies” (ibid). But we see no reason at all. Social
robots are, as machines, as cold and impersonal as any machine.
Or, looked at from another perspective, they are just as warm and
personal as any machine, in the same waywe can fall in love with a
car, an espresso machine, or a house. None of this implies granting
machines rights, at best it means we should take care of artifacts,
as they were the product of hard labour, expressions of human cre-
ativity, received as a gift and so on. In other words: things config-
ure social practices and taking care of things means taking care of
ourselves. By taking care of things, we acknowledge their makers,
we value their human designers, and we pay respect to a person
that paid respect to us by presenting us a thing as a gift.
Gunkel never falls into the trap of inventing fantasy futures
with sentient machines to discuss robot rights. His issue is with
1One may wonder if a perspective that builds on the technological mediation of lived
experience should lead to the conclusion that ‘materiality has agency’ (See Verbeek
2000 [40]). If mediation bymachinesmeans those machines have agency, these should
perhaps deserve rights. We reject the radical ‘symmetrical’ position of Latour, in
which objects and humans are networked as equals. Our position is more tradition-
ally Heideggerian, in that we see technologies as building on and further sustaining
(embodied, embedded, extended) human being.With Verbeek, however,we reject Hei-
degger’s pessimistic dismissal of modern technologies: we think technologies can be
recruited for the better, even if often used for the worst.
the frame of mind that underlies opposition to robot rights, which
in his view betrays an exclusionist ‘anthropocentric’ reasoning,
which not only marginalizes machines but has often been instru-
mental for excluding other human beings [22]. Citing [35] he ar-
gues, “Humans have defined numerous groups as less than human:
slaves, woman, the ’other races,’ children and foreigners...who have
been defined as...as rightsless” [22, p 2].
But the very reason we judge the way slaves and women were
(and still are) treated, as less than human, is that they are used
as a means to an end, as ‘instruments’ white men can use to get
things done. The robot is the very model against which we judge
whether humans are dehumanized. In Hannah Arendt’s terminol-
ogy: dehumanizing people means a reduction of their raison d’etre
to mere labour, a mode of activity she distinguishes from ‘work’ (a
project), and ‘action’ (political action) [2]. By putting actual slaves,
women, and ‘other races’ in one list with robots, one does not hu-
manize them all, one dehumanizes the actual humans in the list.
Consider Coeckelbergh [14], when he writes: “We have emanci-
pated slaves, women, and some animals. First slaves and women
were not treated as ‘men’. However, we made moral progress and
now we consider them as human.” This leads Coeckelbergh, to
speculate on the equal emancipation of robots. But the choice of
words suggests, even if unintended, a Western, white male’s per-
spective on the matter (“we emancipated women...”). The line of
reasoning runs the risk of developing into: “The women and slaves
we liberated should not complain if we, enlightened men, decide
to liberate some more!”
If our own reasoning is by contrast accused of as being ‘anthro-
pocentric’ then yes, this is exactly the point: robots are not humans,
and our concern is with the welfare of human beings (see [33]).
2.3 Robots are not Slaves
As we said earlier, we disagree with treating the robots as slaves.
We, while arguing against robot rights, use the (in)famous Milgram
obedience to authority experiment to show why.
We have to be aware of the difference between the way a per-
son acts, and reflects back on their own actions, in a world they
perceive to be actual, even if that world is in fact based on an illu-
sion, versus the effect of a person’s actions as seen from an outside
observer’s perspective. In the latter, ‘objective’ frame, the partici-
pants in the Milgram experiment caused no harm, because the per-
son who appeared to be screaming in pain was ‘in actuality’, an ac-
tor. In the personal frame however, the world that the participant
perceives to be real, they did do serious harm to another person -
some even experienced having committed a murder. Being told in
hindsight, that their experience was an illusion, did not help some
of them to let go of that conclusion, and several were traumatized:
“A New Haven Alderman complained to Yale author-
ities about the study: ‘I can’t remember ever being
quite so upset’ (p. 132). One subject (#716) checked
mortality notices in the New Haven Register, for fear
of having killed the learner. Another subject (#501)
was shaking so much he was not sure he would be
able to drive home; according to his wife, on the way
home he was shivering in the car and talked inces-
santly about his intense discomfort until midnight
(p. 95). Subject 711 reported that ‘the experiment left
such an effect on me that I spent the night in a cold
sweat and nightmares because of fears that I might
have killed that man in the chair’ ” [8, p 93].
If we look at the way we treat robots as through the eyes of a
Milgram experiment participant, it would indeed be problematic
to treat robots as slaves. The cultural-linguistic move of using the
word slave, would mean - by analogy- that in our enacted world,
wewould turn ourselves into slave owners, in the same ‘true’ sense
that the Milgram participants became murderers.
At the same time, the Milgram experiment frame also shows
why we should object to the idea that the robot machine is treated
unjustly. Following our Milgram logic, the robot is an actor. There
is no real (third person objective) ‘recipient’ of the unethical act.
The only possible victim is the person who turned themselves into
a slave owner, or, perhaps, society at large: if treating robots as
slaves becomes commonplace, we may be engaging in social prac-
tices that we think are not making us better humans. Society may
have reasons to reject such practices, even if no one would ‘do
them for real’ [41].
But regardless of whether we think people are allowed to be
‘lured’ into unethical acts with simulations, it remains the case that
no injustice has been done to the actor that implemented the sim-
ulation, whether it is a human actor in Milgram’s experiment, or a
machine simulating a ‘sentient robot’. Perhaps the ‘robot as slave’
can have a role in an educational setting, or as critical art, but there
is no such thing as ‘robot rights’, other than in fiction.
3 LET’S TALK ABOUT HUMANWELFARE
INSTEAD
There are no robots that come close to the kind of ‘being’ that
humans are, and the kind of ‘being-with’ that humans can have
with other humans. Along with Hubert Dreyfus, we doubt if there
ever will be [18]. Arguing for robot rights on the basis of future
visions of sentient machines is speculative armchair philosophy at
best. Meanwhile popular culture talks about actual AI and robots
as if the intelligent machine is already there, while in fact, it is
not. These sentiments betray the old cognitivist, Cartesian under-
current in AI debates that sees the machines we create as ‘other
agents, very much like ourselves’, instead of what they are: medi-
ators in embodied and socially situated human practices.
One can maintain that it is romantic or ahistorical to think no
technological progress could produce ‘true’ AI in the future. But
romanticism and lack of historical consciousness may be found on
either side of the debate. Raymond Kurzweil [26], for example, pre-
dicts that ‘mind uploading’ will become possible by 2030s and sets
the date for the singularity to occur by 2045. Romantic predictions
like this, invariably envisioning breakthrough some decades into
the future, have been recurring since the earliest days of digital
technology, and all failed. It seems as if “General AI”, “the singular-
ity” and “super-intelligence” are for techno-optimists what dooms-
day is for religious cults.
But it does not matter. Regardless of future predictions, what is
of importance and urgency right now, is to call out the fact that
farfetched romantic vistas of robot workers, robot care-givers and
robot friends, and debating ‘the issue’ of their supposed rights, con-
tributes to real harm being done to individuals and groups, who are
at present socioeconomically disadvantaged (which we elaborate
in the next section). Whether or not our disbelief in the future ex-
istence of true AI will be proven wrong at some point, it is in any
case less harmful than the recurring optimism about purely fic-
tional futures. Because instead of steadily progressing towards a
happy community of humans and ‘sentient AIs’, techno-optimism
contributes to the current development of dehumanizing techno-
logical infrastructure [33]. Debating the necessary conditions for
robot rights keeps putting focus on (non-existent) machines, in-
stead of on real people. In the next section we focus on what does
exist: machines with software that we call ‘AI’, which, in the reality
of today, cause people harm.
3.1 Robots are Used to Violate Human Rights
Discussions of robot ethics, by portraying robots as intelligent sys-
tems as our primary concern, downplays the fact that we are cur-
rently amid artificially intelligent systems rapidly infiltrating ev-
ery aspect of life. The real and urgent issues that are emerging
with the mass deployment of seemingly invisible AI systems need
to be discussed now because they currently impact large groups of
people.
The mass deployment of machines and AI today should propel
us to examine commercial drives behind these machines as well
as the harm and injustice the integration of machines into society
brings. From perpetuation of historical and social bias and injus-
tice [6, 19, 31] to invasion of privacy [43] to exploitation of human
labour [38], often for financial gains for private corporates, AI sys-
tems stand in opposition to human welfare. When AI systems are
deployed and integrated into our day-to-day lives without critical
examination and anticipation of emerging side-effects, they pose
threats to human well-being.
With the rise of machine learning, there is an increased appetite
to hand much of our social, political and economical problems over
to machines bringing with it corporate greed at the expense of
human welfare and integrity [43]. For the corporate world which
produces a great proportion of current AI, profit marks its central
objective, while for those deploying such technologies in various
social sectors, AI seemingly provides a quick and cost-efficient so-
lution to complex and messy social problems. However, the inte-
gration of these systems is proving to be a threat to people’s wel-
fare, integrity and privacy, especially those socioeconomically dis-
advantaged [1, 30, 31]. We discuss a number of these threats below.
3.2 Machine Bias and Discrimination
It has become trivial to point out how decision-making processes
in various social, political and economical sphere are assisted by
automated systems. AI solutions pervade most spheres of life from
screening potential employees to interviewing them, to predicting
where criminal activitymight occur (in some caseswhomight com-
mit a crime) to diagnosing illnesses. These are highly contested and
inherently political and moral issues that the technology industry
is nonetheless treating as “technical problems” that can be quanti-
fied and automated.
The automation of complex social, political and cultural issues
requires that these complex, multivalent and contextual and con-
tinually moving concepts be quantified, measured, classified and
captured through data [29]. Extrapolations, inferences and predic-
tive models are then built often with real life actionable applica-
tions with grave consequences on society’s most vulnerable. Ma-
chine learning systems that infer and predict individual behaviour
and action, based on superficial extrapolations, are then deployed
into the social world resulting in the emergence of various prob-
lems. These systems pick up social and historical stereotypes more
than any deep fundamental causal explanations. In the process, in-
dividuals and groups, often at the margins of society that fail to
fit stereotypical boxes suffer the undesirable consequences [25]. A
recurring theme within algorithmic bias, for example, shows that
individuals and groups that have historically been marginalized
are disproportionately impacted. This includes, for example, bias
in detecting skin tones in pedestrians [42]; bias in predictive polic-
ing systems [32]; gender bias and discriminations in the display of
STEM career ads [27]; racial bias in recidivism algorithms [1]; bias
in the politics of search engines [24]; bias and discrimination in
medicine [20, 30].
AI, far from a future phenomenon waiting to happen, is here op-
erating ubiquitously and with a disastrous impact on socially and
historically marginalized groups. As Weiser remarks: “The most
profound technologies are those that disappear. They weave them-
selves into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguish-
able from it.” Ubiquitous AI is inextricably intertwined with what
it means to be a human being [11]. Yet the question is, how to
best frame this intertwining conceptually? The typical narrative
seems to conceive of AI technologies as some type of social part-
ner that we will communicate and live with in ways comparable to
the ways other human beings are bound up with our lives. In real-
ity, no robot today is anywhere near that future vision. The actual
situationwe have today shows machine learning algorithms as em-
bedded in seemingly mundane tools, supporting everyday tasks.
These algorithms are influencing our basic ’being in the world’ -
the way we perceive and categorise the world, the agency we our-
selves have in acting on it, in a more invisible, Weiserian sense,
which makes it all the more insidious. For example, the humanoid
robot known as Sophia, epitomizes an image that sits well with
widely held conception of “intelligent robots” but whereas in fact,
it has rudimentary engine and capabilities in reality. In compari-
son, iRobot’s Roomba, while portrayed as a harmless household
machine, exerts much more impact on our lives, and the dark side
of it, is that it serves as a surveillance tool that continually harvests
data about our homes. It is easy to overlook the dangers that the
Roomba pauses to our privacy as the machine fades into the back-
ground and becomes silently incorporated into our day-to-day life.
iRobot’s Roomba “autonomous” vacuum cleaner is fitted with a
camera, sensors and software enabling it to build maps of the pri-
vate sanctuary of our home, while tracking its own location[43].
In combination with other IoT devices, the Roomba can be used to
supposedly map our habits,behavours, activities.
Most AI companies boost on capabilities to be able to provide
insights into the human psyche. Financial interests of companies
and engineers that collect, evaluate data and algorithmically in-
terpret and predict behaviors drive AI research and development.
As such “smart” systems infiltrate day-to-day life from the IoT de-
vices to “smart home” all designed to render all corners of lived
experience as behavioral data [43]. Envisioning a future human-
like intelligent system while putting aside such ubiquitous and in-
vasive systems which are a thereat to privacy and human welfare,
shows misplaced concern, to say the least. The integration of ma-
chinic systems into social and human affairs poses immediate dan-
ger, especially to disfranchised people that need the most protec-
tion (O’Neil, 2016). Taking ethical concerns seriously means, we
argue, prioritizing welfare of people, especially those often dispro-
portionally impacted by the integration of machinic systems into
daily life.
3.3 Looking Under the AI Hood: Human labour
If we look at robot rights taking real, existing technologies and the
human practices that they mediate as a starting point, we realize
that it is inherently difficult to draw a boundary around the (artifi-
cial) entity that would need to be granted rights. In fact, attempts
to look at what constitutes current intelligent and seemingly au-
tonomous systems reveals that far from being fully autonomous,
these systems function on exploitive human labour. From robots
to ‘autonomous’ vehicles to sophisticated image recognition sys-
tems, all machines rely heavily on human input. Systems that are
perceived as ‘autonomous’ are never fully autonomous but instead
human-machine systems.
Furthermore, as Bainbridge [4] remarks “the more advanced the
system is, the more crucial the contribution of the human.” This
still remains the case for current intelligent systems [5, 36]. “The
more we depend on technology and push it to its limits, the more
we need highly-skilled, well-trained, well-practiced people tomake
systems resilient, acting as the last line of defence against the fail-
ures that will inevitably occur.” [5]. AI systems rely not only on
high-skilled and well-paid engineers and scientists but also are
heavily dependent on the contribution of the less visible and low-
paid human labour, referred to as “microwork” or “crowd work”.
From annotating and adding labels to images, to identifying ob-
jects in a photograph, to sorting items on a list, these low paid
crowd works prepare “training” data for machines [38]. As well as
poorly paid work, unpaid human labour fuels the development of
proprietary intelligent systems where private corporates control
and benefit from. Google’s reCAPTCHA, which first emerged as
a technique to prevent spam, then used to digitize old books, and
later as means to availing training data for machine learning sys-
tems such as ‘autonomous cars’ and face recognition software 2
is one such example. AI thrives on the backbone of human labour
and as Bainbridge [4] remarked in Ironies of Automation, themore
advanced the technology, the more crucial the contribution of the
human. As image recognition systems becomemore advanced, the
images that humans have to label and annotate become harder,
making the task more difficult for people.
What a close examination of the workings of intelligent systems
reveals is that, not only are AI systems always human-machine sys-
tems but they are also inseparable from the profit driven business
models of the industry that develop and deploy them. AI systems
2see Schmieg & Lorusso (2017) Five Years of Captured Captchas.
http://five.yearsofcapturedcapt.ch/as
are intermeshed with humans (not separate entities) and serve as
a constitutive influence of our being. Using humans to do low-paid
micro-work to make AI possible is, in our view, dehumanizing,
following Hanna Arendts’ category of labour. More generally, the
power imbalance between those that produce and control technol-
ogy and the prioritization of financial profits as central objectives
means that machines are used by the powerful and privileged as
tools that hamper human welfare.
3.4 In Conclusion: Taking Back Control
In October 2019, Emily Ackerman, a wheelchair user, described her
experience of being “trapped” on the road by a Starship Technolo-
gies robot. These robots use the curb ramp to cross streets and
one blocked her access to the sidewalk. “I can tell, as long as they
[robots] continue to operate, they are going to be a major acces-
sibility and safety issue”, complains Ackerman 3. Questions such
as do these robots have the right to use public space and whether
a ban might infringe ‘their’ rights, as debated within the ‘robot
rights’ discourse, prioritize the wrong concerns. It is like protect-
ing the gun instead of the victim. Primary concern should be with
the welfare of marginalized groups (wheelchair users, in this case)
which are disproportionally impacted by the integration of tech-
nology into our everyday lifeworlds.
When a philosopher is contemplating what would be the on-
tological conditions for anything to be granted rights, it is easy
to end up in arguments that compare ‘the rights of the human’
with ‘the rights of the robot’. But this comparison is based on the,
in our view, false belief that sees human being as just a compli-
cated machine, and in thinking that complicated human-made ma-
chines could therefore replicate human being. Based on the post-
Cartesian embodied perspective we hold that while human being
may incorporate, and extend itself in creating and using machines,
the intelligent machine remains a fantasy idea. What is more, what
we see is that in pursuit of this fantasy, real machines are created,
and these very real, data processing pattern recognition algorithms
are increasingly getting in the way of human well-being, up to the
point of contributing to the dehumanization of real humans.
Putting our feet back in reality, what we actually have at hand
are situations in which a human being (a wheelchair user) is denied
free movement by a machine, used by a corporate company who
monopolizes public space for financial gain.
In closing, we turn to responsibility. In our view it is companies,
engineers, policy makers, and the public at large, who are respon-
sible to ensure the rights of individual people. One of the pressing
issues in this day and age is that ‘intelligent’ machines are increas-
ingly used in sustaining forms of oppression. We do not ‘blame’
the machines (they can take no blame), nor do we say machines
must bear ‘responsibility’ [15], precisely because this would relieve
those actually responsible from their duties. We agree that, in the
complex networked society of today, it can be very complex if not
often impossible to trace back accountability to individual people
[15]. But this fact of life (it is complex) is no argument at all formak-
ing machines responsible. By making robots block the part of the
3Pitt pauses testing of Starship robots due to
safety concerns | The PittNews. Wolfe, E. (2019)
https://pittnews.com/article/151679/news/pitt-pauses-testing-of-starship-robots-due-to-safety-concerns/
pavement, a pavement that was designed to allow wheelchair uses
to independently navigate city traffic, we take away part of the
socio-technical embedding that supported a marginalized group
in exerting their autonomy all for a business driven by financial
gains.
More generally speaking, transferring ever more control over
complex processes to intelligent machines - outsourcing our think-
ing and decision making, so to speak, to these technologies, may
actually work against the empowerment of individual human be-
ings, may even prevent them from taking the responsibilities we
would expect to go together with having human rights.
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